This article develops and tests a theory of party group lobbying which demonstrates how the European Parliament's decision-making process shapes interest group interactions with legislators. Interest group behaviour is highly conditional on two motivations: (1) lobby powerful MEPs, and (2) lobby friendly MEPs. Friendliness is based on ideology, with power shaped by institutional rules and seat share. These goals can mutually reinforce each other.
Introduction
A great deal is now known about the incentive structure through which interest groups decide which Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to lobby (Kohler-Koch, 1998; Wessels, 1999; Bouwen, 2004; Eising, 2007; Mahoney, 2008; Marshall, 2010 ). Yet, scant attention has been given to assessing the role that European party group membership may play in this strategic choice, even though it is widely acknowledged that party groups are central to decision-making in the European Parliament (EP) (Attinà, 1990; Hix and Lord, 1997; Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2006) . The reason for this lack of interest may simply be that the explanation is considered self-evident. After all, it is more or less accepted that interest groups have a strong preference to lobby their friends (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998) , which in the EP translates to seeking advocacy from ideologically congruent political parties (Wessels, 1999) . Indeed, these preferences underpin the main argument of the paper.
However, in apparent contradiction, I suggest that interest groups frequently lobby MEPs belonging to the least congruent large party groups. This is because within the EP interest groups have a strong incentive to make certain that their policy position is registered with more than one of the ideologically distinct dominant party families: uncertainty about which parties will form a winning coalition on any given legislative issue means that failing to lobby unfriendly MEPs creates the risk that an interest group's message will go unheard at the negotiating table.
The extent to which organised interests deviate from the 'lobbying friends' strategy is a function of the EP institutional arrangements. It is the EP's rules of procedure that position European party groups at the centre of the political web and in particular privilege the largest party families. With no permanent voting majority in any parliamentary term, decisionmaking has so far always been contingent on the formation of several possible winning coalitions, each of which must contain at least two of the three largest political groups But, in addition to highlighting the limitation to the 'lobbying your friends' thesis an explanation is provided for its resilience. It is anticipated that when the strategic decision is taken to lobby members of a relatively unfriendly party group, interest groups' revert to the practice of discriminating on the basis of policy preferences, but in this instance within the population of least aligned large party group members. As such, they choose to lobby the most sympathetic members from amongst this otherwise off-limits party.
In principle these theoretical expectations are compatible with much of what we already know about the relative influence of MEPs and lobbying in the EP. As such, and in order to facilitate a unified understanding, certain key findings from the literature will be analysed alongside the central argument. These include the assumption that interest groups overwhelmingly lobby MEPs that are members of a germane committee (Bowen, 2004) . This is important to establish because such behaviour would be entirely consistent with the policyseeking motivation that the theory ascribes to interest groups, and as such would necessarily extend the theoretical reach to within the committee system. These ideas are also consistent with the underlying assumption that disparities in legislative influence between MEPs provide a strong incentive for interest groups to modify their strategic behaviour. Therefore it seems appropriate to incorporate into the analysis the insight that legislative influence is also positively correlated with individuals' level of engagement with the legislative process (Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et al, 2010) .
These ideas are examined through several sources of information, including responses by MEPs to surveys carried out by the European Parliamentary Research Group (EPRG) during the 5 th , 6 th and 7 th parliaments ; parliamentary data on the activities of the 724 MEPs that responded to the surveys; and responses received from interest groups.
The starting point for the analysis was selected to coincide with the point that the EP can unambiguously be described as a co-legislature alongside the Council, following the reform and extension of the co-decision procedure (Crombez, 2001 ).
The following section of the paper synthesises key insights about the role of European party groups, national parties, the EP's committee system, and the literature explaining the pattern and causal mechanism of organised interests' interactions with MEPs. Together this investigation underpins the theoretical expectations and testable hypotheses presented in the second section. The methodological approach is set out in the third, including a clear explanation of the variables later used. Thereafter, the results are presented followed by a concluding assessment of the significance of party membership on lobbying behaviour.
Literature
European party groups play a vital role in structuring political debate and coalition formation within the EP (Hix and Lord, 1997; Kreppel, 2002) ; with the rules of procedure facilitating this outcome. What is more, although national party loyalties are likely to take precedence when in conflict with the party group (Ringe, 2010) , these occasions are now far from the norm (Hix and Noury, 2009 ). This increased tendency for party groups to vote en bloc appears to be a consequence of the growth in the EP's institutional power rather than as a function of ideological congruence (Raunio, 1997; Hix et al, 2007) . Each new treaty since the implementation of the Single European Act (1987) has given the EP more power, which has led party groups to increase the incentives for their members to adhere to the party whip.
The inclusion of at least two of the three largest political groups, i.e. the European Peoples Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), 1 or the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), is essential for a winning coalition to form. This is because to date no party has secured a majority of seats, and with no government to support there is no necessity for permanent coalitions to be formed. Although in the past there was a tendency for 'grand coalitions' to form between the PES and the EPP, these have become less common since the early 1990s, and by the 6 th parliament the two largest parties voted independently with the liberals more often than they did with each other (Hix and Høyland, 2011) . This trend was aided by the rapid increase in first reading co-decision agreements, made possible under the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) , which do away with the necessity to form oversize majorities.
The effect has been to facilitate de facto legislative agreements between EP committees and the Council prior to the first reading in plenary, thereby privileging committees (Farrell and Héritier, 2003; Häge and Kaeding, 2007) and in particular the rapporteurs (Héritier, 2007; Costello and Thompson, 2010) . As such, the EP's interinstitutional negotiating position invariably reflects the policy agreed within committee, which is reached through a simple majority of attending members. This delegation of power by the plenary to its legislative committees is only possible because EP committees conform to the formal requirement that they 'reflect the composition of Parliament' (Rule 177; 2010), which includes party group membership (McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009 ).
The institutional framework is constructed in such a way that for a committee member to exert particular legislative influence, sustained engagement with the policy process is required (Marshall, 2010) . This relationship is reflected in the allocation of Committee reports, where MEPs' relative level of voting activity in plenary is one of several explanatory factors (Kreppel, 2002; Yoshinaka et al, 2010) . It follows that MEPs are more likely to join a committee that covers a policy area with salience to those special interests that they are already associated with (Yordanova, 2009) , which makes the finding that committee membership makes no significant difference to the likelihood of an MEP being lobbied by business interests somewhat puzzling (Eising, 2007) .
The literature makes it clear that party groups are integral to decision-making in the EP, which is concentrated within the committee structure. Yet research on interest group behaviour has largely overlooked the role of party groups. The exception is Wessels (1999) who addressed the issue through a series of two-dimensional plots showing the density of interactions between MEPs and interest groups during the pre-Amsterdam era 4 th parliament (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . He identified three broad alignments between interest groups and party groups:
(1) business interests with Liberal, Christian Democrat, and Conservative party groups; (2) trade unions with Communists and Socialist party groups; and (3) environmental and consumer interests with Green and radical party groups.
Attention has been given to the question of whether it is strategically advantageous for interest groups to lobby legislators who are known to be unsympathetic to their cause. The approach taken is rooted in the Congressional literature, where this once live debate appears settled: organised interests hardly ever lobby their opponents, and only occasionally interact
with those yet to decide (Baumgartner and Leech, 1996; Kollman, 1997; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1998) . The underlying logic for this behaviour is provided by the signalling literature, which emphasises the importance of a lobbyist's reputation for providing good quality policy information as a means of overcoming information asymmetries (Parker, 2004 ). The implication is that reputations are built over time and are more likely to be fostered with likeminded policy-makers. A contrasting perspective is offered by Hall and Waymen (1990) , albeit in respect to campaign contributions, in which they show that within congressional committees organised interests commit resources to both mobilise natural supporters and to discourage opposing legislators from mobilising -with the aim of altering patterns of participation rather than the remote prospect of directly securing votes.
In the EP, through formal modelling of interest group behaviour, the applicability of the lobbying your friends' thesis has been demonstrated, at least in respect to the plenary (Crombez, 2002) ; a contribution that remains consistent with Wessel's earlier empirical work. But where the EP literature departs from this perspective it is in respect to the period when the rappporteur drafts her legislative report. Here the institutional constraints are such that considerable agenda setting power is concentrated in the hands of a single possibly friendly legislator. In these circumstances the allure of power trumps that of friendship, with interest groups electing to lobby rapporteurs irrespective of whether they are from a party group that supports opposing policies to their own (Marshall, 2010) .
The corresponding literature encompassing interest group interactions with national parties is surprisingly limited, particularly in respect to unstructured contacts which increasingly dominate relations (Rasmussen and Lindeboom, 2013) . Instead the focus has tended towards in-depth studies analysing ties between parties and closely associated interests (for example, Quinn, 2010 and Thomas, 2001) , in effect drawing upon those relationships first identified by Duverger (1954) as instrumental in creating and sustaining political parties.
In contrast Allern's (2010) in-depth study of the Norwegian case illustrates that parties have links with a diverse set of societal actors rather than a chosen few. This finding corresponds to the observation that through the process of cartelisation the established relationships between political parties and civil society organisations have diminished (Katz and Mair, 1995) , and arguably better approximate to the informal and fluid pattern of lobbying that occurs within the EP (Bowen, 2004 This brief review has highlighted the increasingly decisive role that both large party groups and the committee system play in defining the EP's legislative position. Committee power, which is delegated from the plenary, is contingent on the support of a winning coalition that must include two or more of the largest party groups. Interest groups lobby members of sympathetic party groups within the EP, much as they do within national party systems. Where interest groups refrain from lobbying members of congruent political parties, the literature suggests that this maybe because there is an absence of friendly influential legislators.
Explaining interest group interactions with MEPs
Interest groups seek to influence policy outcomes. Therefore it is expected that groups will adapt their strategic behaviour to take account of the specific nature of the decisionmaking process, which includes the structure of wining coalition formation as well as other hallmarks of legislative influence. But, in the knowledge that if all things are equal it is most advantageous to lobby legislators with closely aligned interests. To maximise the explanatory power and robustly assess the theory of party group lobbying, the analysis is conducted alongside existing ideas that link legislative influence with interest groups' strategic behaviour.
Coalition formation and the effect on party group lobbying
Given the central role played by political groups in EP decision-making, it would be surprising if interest groups' lobbying decisions were party-blind. As such, the three dominant party groups' hold on decision-making will constrain the range of viable parties interest groups can choose to lobby. For example, interest groups which in other circumstances may not be drawn to these pro-integration centrist parties have a strategic incentive to redirect at least part of their lobbying effort to parties at the centre of coalition formation. Therefore, it is expected that:
MEPs from the three dominant party groups are lobbied more often than members from other party families.
However, the fluid nature of winning coalition formation has an additional effect on interest groups' strategic behaviour. They intentionally engage in lobbying MEPs from the least friendly of the dominant political groups. The reason for this surprising yet theoretically consistent behaviour is that unlike most national parliaments, where voting coalitions are broadly stable and therefore known in advance, in the EP it is uncertain which party groups will be on the winning side. This creates a powerful incentive for interest groups to 'hedge their bets' and divert considerable lobbying effort away from the party group that they are naturally more associated with, to a party that is a non-natural ally. Therefore, in contrast to the expectation found in the literature we should observe that:
The frequency of MEP interactions with groups representing either civil society or producer interests will be similar for members of both the EPP and PES.
However, rather than falsifying the 'lobbying your friends' thesis, these expectations simply represent a further and more significant limitation to interest groups' unconstrained lobbying preference, i.e. in addition to lobbying unfriendly rapporteurs. This is because interest groups underlying motivation, even when constrained, continues to structure their choice of lobbying target. Therefore, when for strategic reasons interest groups lobby a party group that is not a natural ally, they revert to their unconstrained default position and lobby those closest to their own policy preferences, but in this case within the population of nonfriendly party members. Therefore, the expectation is that: 
Towards a unified understanding: participation and committee membership
It seems plausible to expect that interest groups' interactions with MEPs are conditional upon the latter's membership of a policy relevant committee, particularly given that the EP's policy output has become increasingly defined through the scrutiny carried out by its standing committees (Corbett et al 2011) . But if committee membership turned out to be unimportant to lobbyists (Eising, 2007) , it would suggest that they are not policy-seekers, thereby falsifying a key assumption of the theory as presented. In contrast, empirical support for the relationship would suggest that what holds for the theory of party group lobbying will hold within the EP's committees, which would maximise the explanatory power of the theory. As such, we should observe that:
. Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are members of a policy relevant committee than non-members.
But, although committee membership may provide the opportunity to be influential, this is not to say that committee members are equally influential, and hence of equivalent interest to lobbyists. However, given that relative levels of participation in the legislative process are an important factor in determining policy influence (Kreppel, 2002; and Yoshinaka et al, 2010) , and the theoretical assumptions presented thus far are predicated on interest groups' desire to lobby influential legislators, it should be the case that:
Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are active legislators.
The Data
To assess the inherently unobservable phenomenon of lobbying behaviour, the analysis draws on several sources of MEP data covering three European Parliaments (1999-2004; 2004-2009; and 2009-14) . The sample under analysis is defined by responses to three surveys of MEPs (2000 MEPs ( , 2006 MEPs ( , and 2010 conducted by the EPRG . For ∀ = 1, … ,9
Where:
Testing for over-dispersion in each of the models (H o : = 1), the results suggest that the model under-fits the amount of dispersion in lobbying for all categories. Therefore it is appropriate to adopt the negative binomial model specification. However, several categories contained a significant number of zero counts. This necessitated the use of a zero inflated negative binomial specification, where the count outcome is weighted by the probability of that count being zero. 8 The first model specification measures responses for each of the nine interest categories.
The second and third model specifications include all explanatory variables except for party groups, but are constrained respectively by membership of the EPP (2 nd model) and PES (3 rd model). This enables the effect of interest group lobbying of non-natural allies (and allies) to be assessed given that of the three dominant party groups, the EPP and PES occupy the most clearly contrasting positions on the dominant left/right political dimension. This distinction is replicated amongst the population of interest groups through the simplifying assumption that the five producer interests (agriculture, industry, transport, trade, and banking & insurance) are likely to be allied more closely to the EPP, and are therefore nonnatural allies of the PES. This logic is then applied to the four civil societal interests (environment, human rights, gender, and consumer interests), with the expectation that their interests are more closely aligned with the PES.
Results
This section assesses the extent to which the theoretical ideas stand up to scrutiny. The first step is to consider the hypotheses that explicitly relate to party groups. This is followed by an evaluation of the contextual expectations, which define the scope and relevance of the theory.
Party group lobbying
The (transport groups). This effect is also closely replicated for the liberals (ALDE). Again significant results are found for eight of the nine categories of interest groups, indicating an increase in lobbying of party members ranging from 30.6% (consumer groups) to 214.2%
(human rights groups).
These results lend considerable support to the theory, but what had not been anticipated is the strong focal point provided by the Green Party for environmental, consumer and agriculture/fisheries lobbyists. Interestingly, these results suggest that in the policy areas where the Green Party receives significant lobbying attention, the PES appears to be somewhat less favoured compared to other policy areas. This may be indicative of a reallocation of the portion of lobbying attention that is directed to 'friendly' left of centre parties.
--- Table 1 about here ---
To test the hypothesis that the frequency of MEP interactions with groups representing either civil society or producer interests will be similar for members of both the EPP and PES (H 2 )
, the predicted counts (contacts) for the two party groups are assessed across all 9 categories of interest groups. The results are shown in Table 2 ; with committee membership, participation and parliament set to their mean value; rapporteurship to 0, left/right self-placement to 5, and country values set to Germany. 10 The initial impression is that the relative party values for each category of interest group are broadly comparable, which is line with the expectation. More specifically, when comparing each pair of predicted counts we find that all confidence intervals overlap at the 95% level, enabling the null hypothesis to be rejected. It is also interesting to note that in 3 of the 4 instances (out of 18)
where the predicted counts fall outside the opposing confidence interval we observe higher levels of unfriendly lobbying than friendly. Indeed the results give the impression of a fluid lobbying environment with PES lobbying likely to be higher than for the EPP in 2 of the 4 categories of producer interest, with the converse true for 3 of the 4 categories of civil society.
---Table 2 about here ---
An alternative perspective is provided through interviews with 80 interest groups representing both civil society and producer interests. Interviewees were asked to consider the number of policy related contacts that they have had with the three largest party groups, and then allocate a percentage to each. The results, in respect to the EPP and PES, are presented in Table 3 . Although less convincing than those for the much larger sample of MEP reported contacts they nevertheless suggests that lobbying of unfriendly party groups is only 20% less common than lobbying of friendly groups, which is a long way from Baumgartner and Leech's (2002) assertion that this activity hardly ever happens.
---Table 3 about here ---
It is also interesting to note, with reference to Model 1 (Table 1) , that for each party group, the average increase in lobbying contacts for both producer and civil society interests turns out to be broadly comparable i.e. for the EPP: 70.3% / 78.4%; and for the PES: 53.3% / 55.7%. This indicates that the decision to lobby large party groups may be less constrained by ideology than the decision of which individual party member to lobby. This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows the predicted counts for two categories of interests (business and civil society). Through the left/right self-placement scores (x-axis), the intensity of banking/insurance lobbying is shown to increase as MEPs move away from the left side of the ideological spectrum. The mirror-image of this effect can be observed for consumer groups. 11 Interestingly, although the theory provides no expectation for lobbying within supportive party groups the same ideological bias is observable.
---Figure 1 about here ---
This provides some confidence to assess the final party group hypothesis that when interest groups attempt to influence dominant party groups that are naturally less supportive, they lobby those members with relatively close policy preferences (H 3 ). This expectation is assessed with the aid of models 2 & 3 (Table 4 ). Here the results for each independent variable (interest category) relate only to members of the corresponding naturally less supportive party group. Hence the lobbying activities of civil society interests (4 categories)
are reported for members of the EPP (model 2), whereas the lobbying activities of producer interests (5 categories) are reported for members of the PES (model 3). Two approaches are taken to assess this hypothesis.
--- Table 4 
Committee membership and participation
Given that the EP's legislative committees have progressively increased their hold on policy making during the post-Amsterdam period of this analysis, it is vital to understand whether interest group behaviour reflects this shift in political power. If it can be shown that
Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are members of a policy relevant committee than non-members (H 4 ), and this finding holds within the analysis (models)
presented thus far, then the theory of party group lobbying will be equally applicable within the EP's strong committee system.
Preliminary evidence for this expectation is offered in Figure 2 (above), which distinguishes between committee members and other MEPs, but a full assessment is made with reference to the committee membership dummy variable reported in model 1 (Table 1) .
Here the coefficients for all 9 committees are in the expected direction, and significant at the .01 level. This can be interpreted as, for example, the effect of committee membership in the committee with responsibility for consumer policy is to increase the expected number of consumer group lobbying contacts by 176.2 (%), holding all other variables constant. These encouraging findings also hold for interest group lobbying of large party groups that are nonnatural allies, as shown in models 2 & 3 (Table 4 ) with reference to the same committee membership variable.
The final expectation is that Interest groups are more likely to lobby MEPs that are active legislators (H 5 ) . Support for this hypothesis would further imbed the theory within the wider legislative literature, whilst providing a further insight in to how lobbyists differentiate between legislators, whereas a null result would challenge a key theoretical assumption that lobbyists are instrumental in their policy-seeking actions.
To make an evaluation the initial step is to assess the variable participation through the first model (Table 1) . Here support for the hypotheses is found from seven of the nine interest groupings at the .1 level of significance or above. For a 1% increase in a MEPs attendance at roll-call votes, their likelihood of being lobbied increases by between 0.5% and 2.4%. This level of increase is substantial when put in the context of the 12% to 100% range in MEP's level of attendance (mean = 80.2). Moreover, this finding also holds for the majority of interest categories when lobbying non-natural allies (models 2 & 3).
An alternative 'within committee' assessment is made through the explanatory variable rapporteur, which captures the most clearly identifiable act of participation. The results presented in model 1 (Table 1) show that seven of the nine committees are significant at the .1 level and in the direction anticipated, offering further support to the hypothesis.
Holding all other variables constant the effect of each report that a committee member writes is to increase the expected number of lobbying contacts by a policy relevant interest group by between 13.1% (environmental groups) and 100.6% (women's organisations). However, the results for lobbying a rapporteur that is a non-natural ally (models 2 & 3) are less convincing.
Although, eight of the nine categories are in the anticipated direction, just four are at a sufficient level of significance (0.1 or above). The predicted counts for H 4 and H 5 are projected in Figure 3 , for two categories of interest group lobbying.
---Figure 3 about here ---

Discussion
This article establishes that interest groups that are active in the EP are policy-seekers with a highly nuanced grasp on the decision-making process. As a consequence, they identify that membership of any given party group or legislative committee will contribute to the differences in legislative influence between MEPs, and that within these memberships the distribution of influence is unevenly distributed. In addition, interest groups are able to assess
MEPs' relative responsiveness to their policy position, as well as recognise and respond to the fluidity of voting coalitions. This knowledge amounts to a formidable array of strategic considerations.
Fundamental to the explanation is the atypical nature of vote-winning coalitions in the EP, which can and frequently do exclude one of the two largest party families. This situation occurs as a consequence of an institutional design that has at its heart a parliament with no government to support, and in which to date no party has achieved an overall majority of seats. As a result, it is difficult for lobbyists to predict which leading party family will be on the winning side of any given vote. This matters because if an interest group receives even very limited support from a winning coalition it may well be an improvement on receiving strong support from a party group that is excluded from the negotiating table. As such, in the absence of a voting equilibrium, interest groups choose to 'hedge their bets'.
This explanation has benefitted from an analytical approach that synthesises theoretical expectations with some of what we already know about the relative influence of
MEPs. The analysis adds traction to Hall and Waymen's (1990) somewhat out of favour finding that in addition to organised interests expending resources persuading influential legislators within a friendly party to mobilise, there is a compelling reason to also persuade influential members of unfriendly party to desist from mobilising even if this latter activity is less effective. This is because the likelihood of persuading an influential member of an unfriendly party to refrain from actively participating is surely higher if they are at least relatively friendly.
Finally, the findings presented may well have implications for interest group behaviour in national parliaments, although here a different pattern of lobbying is anticipated.
The key distinction is that in the national setting winning coalitions are generally stable owing to the presence of a permanent governing majority. Therefore, it should follow that interest groups for whom at least one governing party is an ally will have little or no incentive to lobby opposition parties. In contrast those interest groups that are aligned with a party in opposition will have a strong incentive to build relationships with governing parties. 
